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BEYOND THE BINARY: WHAT CAN FEMINISTS





JULIE GREENBERG: Our panel will be discussing recent devel-
opments in the intersex and transsexual communities. The transsexual
community began to organize in the 1970s, but did not fully develop
into a vibrant movement until the 1990s. The intersex movement was
born in the mid-1990s and has rapidly developed a strong and influen-
tial voice. Recently, both movements have undergone profound changes
and each has provided new and unique theoretical perspectives that can
potentially benefit other social justice groups. The purpose of our dia-
logue today is to describe these developments and explore how feminists
could potentially benefit from the theoretical frameworks that are being
advanced by the intersex and transsexual communities.
Before we begin our discussion, I want to provide a brief summary
of the terminology we will be using. When we refer to a person with an
intersex condition or a disorder of sex development (DSD), we will be
discussing a person whose reproductive or sexual anatomy is not all
clearly male or clearly female. When we use the word transsexual, we are
referring to a person whose reproductive system and sexual anatomy do
not match the person's self-identified gender.
It is impossible to cover all the recent developments in both move-
ments. In our limited time, we will focus primarily on developments in
the transsexual community, but I will start by summarizing recent de-
velopments in the intersex movement. Although the intersex movement
is in its infancy, during the past few years, the movement has accom-
plished some of its primary goals and has undergone some dramatic
shifts in its focus.
When the intersex movement began, it followed the model of
many other social justice identity movements. For example, just as other
social justice movements chose to reclaim and recharacterize pejorative
terms, such as the word "queer,"~ that had be en used against them, the
Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) published a newsletter, titled
Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
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"Hermaphrodites with Attitude."' The group sought to end the shame
and secrecy surrounding the birth of a child with an intersex condition
and develop a support network for these children and their families. The
intersex movement approached other organizations that it believed
would share common concerns and goals. It associated closely with gay
and AIDS activist groups and adopted some of their tactics, including
staging protests at medical gatherings. It also viewed itself as a logical
progression in the evolution of civil rights struggles by feminists, gays
and lesbians, and transsexuals, and acknowledged the beneficial paths
2that had been forged by the transsexual movement.
Recently, many in the intersex movement have shifted away from
an identity politics model. Although the early movement closely allied
itself with the LGBT community, many intersex activists have distanced
themselves from LGBT politics and have started utilizing a disability-
rights framework. Transsexuals, on the other hand, are closely allied with
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals; most major gay and lesbian organizations
have added "T" to their acronym and are including transsexual concerns
on their agendas.
Some of you may be questioning the relevance of including this
topic at a feminist legal theory conference. I believe that feminists can
benefit from examining the development of the different movements
and the alliances and rifts that have occurred among the various organi-
zations. One would think that close alliances and working relationships
would have developed among people who have focused their energies on
ending discrimination based on sex, gender, sexual orientation, and
gender identity. Unfortunately, dissention has developed among the
various groups. Some disagreements are a part of our history and have
been effectively resolved, but many of these disputes have not been suc-
cessfully addressed and new divisions are developing.
One current concern is that the various communities do not share
common goals and some fear that forming alliances among the various
groups may be counterproductive. Some activists believe that although
sex, gender, sexual orientation, and gender identity concerns overlap, the
different movements have distinct and sometimes incompatible goals. I
believe that these diverse movements, including feminists, can learn
about more effective ways to frame their issues and agendas by examin-
1. Welcome, I Hermaphrodites with Attitude 6 (Intersex Society of North America,
Rohnert Park, Cal.), (Winter 1994), available at http://www.isna.org/fdes/hwa-
winter1995.pdf.
2. Eli Nevada & Cheryl Chase, Natural Allies, I Hermaphrodites with Attitude 11, (In-
tersex Society of North America, Rohnert Park, Cal.), (Summer 1995), available at
http://www.isna.org/files/hwa/summerl995.pdf.
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ing our history and learning about the risks associated with not forming
mutually beneficial alliances.
Feminists and lesbians, especially if you were in college as I was
during the growth of second-wave feminism, are aware of our not-so-
pretty history. The feminist movement was a white, upper-class, hetero-
sexual movement. Lesbians were referred to as the purple menace and
leading feminists distanced themselves from lesbians and their issues.
These feminists were concerned that incorporating lesbians into the
movement would lead to societal rejection of all feminist concerns be-
cause of the homophobia that was prevalent at this time. Eventually,
lesbian activists were able to successfully reframe the vision of a feminist
to put lesbian concerns front and center. Women who loved other
women were seen as more female than women who desired sex with
men. Currently, many key positions in feminist organizations are held
by lesbians and the lesbian agenda is a critical part of the feminist
3movement.
Many second-wave feminists were even more opposed to the inclu-
sion of transsexuals than they were to incorporating lesbians into the
women's movement. This aversion to including transsexuals in some
female spaces still exists. Three justifications for excluding transsexuals
and their concerns have been raised. First, some feminists have asserted
that male-to-female transsexuals should be excluded from feminist
groups because they are not true women and they continue to exercise
the power associated with their male privileged upbringing. Second,
some feminists have argued that female-to-male transsexuals should be
excluded because they have rejected their womanhood to gain the ad-
vantages awarded to men in our patriarchal system. Finally, and
probably most important, some feminists have maintained that trans-
sexuals buy into essentialist notions of sex and gender and
inappropriately seek to cross the gender divide rather than deconstruct
. 4
it.
One prominent example of this rejection occurred at the Michigan
Womyn's Music Festival (MWMF), one of the largest annual social
gatherings of women. Women forcefully ejected a ma-le-to-female trans-
sexual attendee when she identified herself in a workshop as a
transgender woman. MWTMF then adopted a "womyn-born-womyn'
policy. Although MW(MvF has deleted this reference in its current
3. LILLIAN FADERMsAN, ODD Giu~s AND TWILIGHT LovEas 212 (Columbia University
Press 1991); KARLuA JAY, TALES OF THE LAVENDER MENACE: A MEMOIR OF LIBERA-
TION 137-138 (Basic Books 2000).
4. Anna Kirkland, Victorious Transsexuals in the Courtroom: A Challenge for Feminist
Legal Theory, 28 LAw& Soc. INQUIRY 1 (2003).
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materials and no longer evicts transsexual women from the festival, it
still has failed to embrace transsexuals or fully include them in their
celebration of the "diversity" of women.'
Later feminists, many of whom were born during the 1960s and
1970s, who identify as third-wave feminists, are more ambivalent to-
wards trans rights. Daughters of second-wave feminists were typically
taught that gender would not play a role in determining their future
success. Therefore, some younger women find it difficult to relate to
someone who would want to transition to the opposite sex. They ques-
tion how anyone could assign gender such critical importance that it
would become the defining feature of the person's identity.
Many feminist activists have moved away from the original outright
rejection of transsexuals. Some feminists, however, still fail to under-
stand transsexual concerns and transsexuals are far from fully
incorporated into the feminist movement.
Divisions have also arisen between lesbians and transsexuals. Al-
though transsexuals were on the front lines at Stonewall in 1969, as the
gay and lesbian movement developed, transsexuals and their issues were
marginalized or completely rejected. During the 1970s and 1980s,
transsexual concerns rarely appeared in LGB organizations' mission
statements. Many gays and lesbians viewed transsexuals' claims as valid,
but unconnected to the gay and lesbian movement. They did not under-
stand the connection between gay and transsexual rights and believed
that trying to combine the two diverse issues would lead to a loss of fo-
cus and effectiveness.6
In contrast, most transsexuals believe that the movements are in-
separable. First, a large number of transsexuals also identify as lesbian,
gay or bisexual. More importantly, they recognize that homophobia and
transphobia are closely linked and that bias and violence against both
groups is motivated by animosity towards those who transgress gender
7norms.
This issue came to a head in 2007 when Congress was considering
passing the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), a law that
would prohibit discrimination based upon sexual orientation. The
original version of the bill also prohibited discrimination based upon
gender identity and expression. When it appeared that a transgender
5. See Nan Alamnilla Boyd, Bodies in Motion: Lesbian and Transsexual Histories, in A
QUEER WORL.D: THE CENTER FOR LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER 134, 143-145
(New York University Press 1997).
6. Shannon Minter, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Righis?. in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS
141-42 (University of Minnesota Press 2006).
7. Id
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inclusive ENDA would not pass, Barney Frank proposed a bill that de-
leted the "gender identity and expression" language. All the major
LGBT organizations, except the Human Rights Campaign, joined forces
to oppose the new version. They united together to oppose the passage
of any bill that protected gays and lesbians, but not transsexuals. This
united stand was a watershed moment in the incorporation of transsex-
ual concerns in the gay and lesbian agenda.'
The intersex and feminist movements have also been at logger-
heads. During the early years of the intersex movement, feminist
viewpoints about the social construction of gender resonated with many
intersex persons. Feminist theory provided a supportive framework for
people whose gender identity did not conform to the sex assigned to
them at birth, as well as those who had developed an intersex identity. It
also helped many intersex persons understand how their medical treat-
ment had been based on societal assumptions about appropriate
genitalia and gender roles.
The intersex movement met rejection from feminists who worked
to oppose female genital cutting (FGC) as it is practiced in non-western
countries. Although the reasons for opposing genital surgery on intersex
infants are similar to the arguments made by feminists opposed to FGC,
anti-FGC feminists have failed to include surgeries on intersex infants
on their agendas. Surgeries on intersex infants and FGC often result in
almost identical physical harms. In addition, they are both medically
unnecessary and are performed without the informed consent of the
patient. Most important, just as FGC is used to reinforce gender norms,
one of the goals of intersex surgeries is to reinforce heterosexism and
cultural norms of appropriate gender roles.
Intersex activists believe that anti-FGC feminists should recognize
the parallels between the harmful practices of FGC and genital surgery
performed on intersex infants. They have asked anti-FGC feminist
groups to help them convince legislatures to include infant intersex
genital surgeries within the ban on FGC. Despite the similarities be-
tween the surgeries, their negative physical and psychological effects,
and the patriarchal heterosexist norms that support both practices, anti-
FGC feminists have excluded intersex concerns from their agenda. Thus
far, western feminist organizations that oppose FGC have refused to
criticize western doctors who perform surgery on intersex infants.
Although intersex activist organizations have attempted to form an alli-
ance with anti-FCC feminists, these overtures have been rejected.!
8. Emily Douglas, An Uneasy Alliance, Am~. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 2008, at 30.
9. Cheryl Chase, "Cultural Practice" or "Reconstructive Surgery"? Genital Cutting the Inter-
sex Movement, and Medical Double Standards, in GENITAL CIYITING & TRANSNATIONAL
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Currently, conflicts are developing between the intersex and trans-
sexual communities. Some in the intersex movement believe that the
primary goal should be to end surgeries on intersex infants. They believe
that this goal is too far removed from the major goals of LGBT organi-
zations. In addition, many intetsex activists are moving away from an
identity politics model and instead are framing their issues in terms of
disability rights.
As a final introductory comment, I believe one of the major lessons
that feminists can learn from the intersex and transsexual movements
relates to the advantages and disadvantages of working within a binary
sex model. An important question that feminists need to address is
whether gender rights are more effectively advanced by working within
the binary or instead trying to dismantle our binary sex and gender sys-
tem.
MARYBETH HERALD: Government and private discrimination
against transsexuals falls into at least two major areas: sex determination
and sex discrimination.
Sex Determination: The government's determination of a person's
legal sex carries broad implications in our society and affects, among
other matters, marriage, child custody, and identity documents. For ex-
ample, most states currently prohibit same-sex marriage. The label
"male" prohibits a person from marrying another man and the female
marker bars marriage to another woman. To determine whether a mar-
riage is between a male and a female, however, requires the government
to determine each person's sex. The issue of who is a male or a female
seems self-evident to a lot of people- the "I know it when I see it" ap-
proach. But appearances are deceiving. The scientific literature reveals a
more complex model than outward physical characteristics disclose, or
venturing below the surface, chromosomes indicate.'0 Rather, many dif-
ferent factors play a role in determining male or female status. Most of
the population has congruent factors that all point in the direction of
either male or female, but a significant minority do not conform to the
majority model.
When the courts began addressing the question of a person's legal
sex, they seemed confounded by the challenge. In the early cases consid-
ering these issues, courts sometimes acknowledged the complexity but
then retreated to a simplistic solution: whatever it says on your birth
certificate, whatever the doctor decided at that time of birth, is one's sex
SISTERH-OOD 126, 140-42 (Stanlie M. James & Claire C. Robertson eds., University
of Illinois Press 2002).
10. Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Between
Law and Biology, 41 Aiuz. L. REv. 265 (1999).
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for life."1 The court effectively ruled that when the ink dried on the birth
certificate, nothing could change it - not even if a person had gender
reassignment surgery. Focusing on birth, even when subsequent history
rendered that event a questionable marker, provided a convenient tool to
avoid defining male and female. After a time for reflection and thought,
however, a more modern approach developed in Australia, New Zea-
land, and Europe that permitted documents to reflect a change in sex
under some circumstances."2 But the theories allowing these changes
leave the binary sex structure and heterosexual marriage undisturbed.
Marriage is not the only area where one's legally determined sex will
affect important life events. Given our increasingly security conscious
society, documents that verify your identity and carry personal informa-
tion such as your age, sex, and even height and weight are increasingly
required. Whether your driver's license or passport identifies you as male
or female makes a difference if you are stopped for security at the airport
or at a traffic light. Finally, one's sex determination will have implica-
tions for housing, bathroom, and locker room use.
In addition to sex determination issues, transsexuals face sex dis-
crimination issues. Discrimination issues arise in employment, schools,
housing, insurance, medical coverage, and hate crimes. We obviously,
with our time limits, will be able to touch on only a few points. This topic
11. In the early influential case of Corbett v. Corbet the English court considered a chal-
lenge to the validity of a marriage between a postoperative male-to-female transsexual
and a male. (1970) 2 All E.R. 33 (P.). The transsexual wife had male chromosomes
QMY and at birth, genitals (a penis) and male gonads (testicles). The chromosomes
remained unchanged at the time of trial, but the genitals and gonads had been al-
tered. The court voided the marriage as an illegal same-sex marriage between two
males. The court decided that the sex assigned at birth was unchangeable, no matter
the current state of a person's genitalia or self-identity. Corbett, 2 All E.R. at 44-45.
In Canada and Singapore, judges cited Corbett, denying any legal effect to medical al-
terations of sex. C. (L.) v. C. (C.), [19921 10 O.R.3d 254 (Can.); Lim Ying v. Hiok
Kian Ming Eric, [1992] 1 S.L.R. 184 (ruling that a person's legal sex is established at
birth and does not change based upon medical intervention). Moreover, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rejected challenges under the European
Convention on Human Rights (European Convention), which found in its early
cases no rights violation when a country refused to allow post-operative transsexuals
to marry in their self-identified gender role. See, e.g., Sheffield & Horsham v. United
Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R_ 2011; Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(1987), overruled by Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1; Cossey
v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).
12. See In re Kevin (2001) 28 Fain. L.R. 158 (Austl.) available at http:ll
www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/family-.ct/2001/1074.html,aff d (2003) 30 Fain.
L.R. I (Austl.) available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulau/cases/cth/family--st
2003/94.htmld. Attorney-General v. Otahuhu Family Court, [1991] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603
(H.C.); Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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is relevant to feminists because of the way that courts are interpreting the
word "sex" in statutes that prohibit discrimination because of sex.
MARK STRASSER: My focus will be on family issues. To illus-
trate some of the difficulties that might arise for families where one of
the adults is transsexual, we might consider the family of Thomas Be-
atie.
Thomas Beatie, who has written a book"3 and appeared on Oprah,
is a female-to-male transsexual who has given birth to two children since
transitioning. At some point in time, it may be important to determine
whether he, his wife, and their two children are considered a family in
the eyes of the law. That may depend on whether he is viewed legally as
male or female.
His amended birth certificate from Hawaii states that he is male.
Further, the state where he and his family now live, Oregon, permits
birth certificates to be amended, so it might seem that he of course
would be viewed as male by Oregon law However, it should be noted
that those states permitting birth certificates to be modified differ about
the requirements that must be met before such a modification will be
permitted. An individual who meets the criteria for having his or her
birth certificate amended in one state might not have met the relevant
criteria in a different state, and that latter state might refuse to give
credit to the birth certificate amendment authorized by the former state.
Even if a judge is tempted as a general matter to give credit to a
birth certificate amendment from another state, she might be less
tempted in a case involving someone like Beatie. Basically, the court
would have to decide whether to recognize the modification and treat as
male someone who had given birth to two children after having under-
gone the relevant procedures.
A judge with an essentialist view of the sexes might hesitate before
declaring that a man can give birth to a child. Indeed, historically, courts
would sometimes justify their refusal to permit a birth certificate modi-
fication precisely because permitting such a change might create the
possibility that a man would be able to give birth to a child. On their
view, using a chromosome test was preferable. Chromosomes do not
change and the judge would not be in the position of declaring someone
a man who had XX chromosomes and who had delivered a child. (Let
us bracket for the moment that not all individuals have either XX or XY
chromosomes.)
It might be noted, however, that one can have an essentialist under-
standing of the sexes without focusing on giving birth as a defining
13. THOMAS BEATIE, LABOR OF LOVE: THE STORY OF ONE MAN'S EXTRAORDINARY
PREGNANCY 161 (Sea] Press 2008).
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characteristic. Beatie, for example, seems to have a binary view of the
sexes and believes that one is either male or female, but he defines the
sexes differently so that there is no contradiction in saying that a man
can give, birth.
It might be tempting to think that once a state permits a change to
the sex marker on a birth certificate, that change would be applicable for
all purposes. However, that has not been the view embraced by the
states. Rather, states have taken the position that an individual can be
viewed as female for certain purposes and male for other purposes. Even
more confusing, it may not be clear whether a person will be considered
male or female for a particular purpose until the matter goes through
the courts.
Consider the case of J'Noel Ball and Marshall Gardiner."4 J'Noel
transitioned from male to female in Wisconsin and her Wisconsin birth
certificate was amended to reflect that change. J'Noel met Marshall.
They began dating and eventually married. He had been informed
about her history prior to the marriage, so there could be no claim that
he had been defrauded into marrying her.
The question before the Kansas Supreme Court was whether J'Noel
was a woman for purposes of the state marriage statute. If so, then her
marriage would be valid and she would be entitled to all of the benefits
due to a widow whose husband had died intestate. However, if J'Noel
was viewed by the state as a man for purposes of marriage, then J'Noel's
marriage to Marshall would be viewed as void and of no legal effect.
J'Noel would be a legal stranger to Marshall. She would not be entitled
to receive any of his estate and the sole heir would be Marshall's es-
tranged son. The Kansas Supreme Court held that J'Noel was a man for
purposes of the state's marriage law, amended birth certificate notwith-
standing, and that therefore she was not Marshall's widow.
An analogous issue arose in Texas."5 Christie Littleton, a post-
operative, male-to-female transsexual, had met and eventually married
Jonathan Littleton after having informed him about her history. Again,
there was no claim of fraud or misrepresentation. Christie's husband,
Jonathan, had died, allegedly because of medical malpractice, and she
was suing his doctor for wrongful death.
In this case, Christie had undergone sex reassignment surgery in
Texas and, during the litigation, had had her birth certificate amended
in accord with Texas law. Here, the issue was whether Christie was a fe-
male for purposes of the Texas marriage stature. If so, then her marriage
to Jonathan was valid and she could pursue the wrongful death action.
14. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002).
15. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
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if not, then her marriage to Jonathan would be void and of no legal ef-
fect and she would be precluded from pursuing this cause of action
because in the eyes of the law she would be a legal stranger to her hus-
band of several years.
Gardiner and Littleton involved scenarios where a post-operative
transsexual married someone who was not of her self-identified sex. But
an individual might marry someone of a different chromosomal sex and
only later realize that he or she is trangendered. Louisiana has a statute
that speaks to the conditions under which one's birth certificate can be
amended. That law includes a provision regarding notification of the
current spouse, so Louisiana law recognizes that an individual might be
married and then seek to have the sex marker of his or her birth certifi-
cate amended. 16 Surprisingly, Louisiana law does not address the
Litteton/ Gardiner scenario where a post-operative transsexual seeks to
marry someone not of his or her self-identified sex. The failure to ad-
dress this possibility means that it will have to be litigated, e.g., in the
context of a wrongful death case. Or, it may come up in the context of a
divorce-one of the parties who, perhaps, has all of the property in his
or her name seeks to avoid a property division or being forced to pay
spousal support by claiming that the marriage was void ab initio because
both of the parties are of the same chromosomal sex. The marriage
might then be viewed as if it had never existed and the parties would be
legal strangers to one another.
Let us again consider Thomas Beatie and his family. Suppose for
whatever reason his marriage to his current spouse does not work out
and one or the other files for divorce. One of the parties might challenge
the validity of the marriage because they are of the same chromosomal
sex. Were the court to find that the marriage was void and of no legal
effect, there would be a variety of questions that would have to be an-
swered. Not only might property or spousal support be at issue but a
separate question would be whether each adult would be recognized as
having a legal relationship to the children of the marriage. For example,
as a general matter, a child born into a marriage is presumed to be the
child of each spouse. But if the marriage is viewed as a nullity, then Be-
atie's partner might not be afforded that presumption.
Certainly, some states have equitable doctrines whereby an individ-
ual who has a de facto parental relationship will be recognized in law as
having a relationship with those children. Further, there are other possi-
bilities as well. In some states, a non-marital partner is permitted to
establish a parental relationship with his or her partner's child via a sec-
16. See IA. REv. STAT. ANN. §40:62(B)(2001).
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ond parent adoption. However, part of the difficulty here is that it
would not be clear prospectively whether an adoption was necessary.
Let us add an additional wrinkle. Suppose that Beatie's wife does
not want to rely on the presumption of parenthood afforded to a spouse
when a child is born into a marriage. Because she has no biological con-
nection to the children, she decides to adopt as a way of legally
cementing her parental status. She avails herself of the stepparent adop-
tion option. Here, there is no other adult (in addition to Beatie) who
has parental rights, Beatie consents, and the adoption is in the best in-
terests of the child. But a separate question to be resolved in light of
state law would be whether a stepparent adoption can be considered
valid if the individual attempting to make use of that provision was not
in fact a stepparent of the child. Thus, were the marriage declared void
ab initio, then IBeatie's wife would not have been a stepparent and a
court would have to decide whether the adoption would be recognized
by the state.
Needless to say, having courts decide whether a couple is married or
whether a parent-child relationship exists at the time of divorce or after
one of the parties has died is simply unacceptable. Such a system jeop-
ardizes the reasonable expectations of all of the parties and creates unfair
incentives. Consider how much it might be worth to an individual not
to have the validity of his or her marriage or parent-child relationship
contested. It would not be surprising if individuals would be quite will-
ing to sacrifice spousal support or property to avoid rolling the dice to
see whether a court would recognize the validity of the marriage.
JULIE GREENBERG: Marks comments also relate back to my
initial remarks about shifting alliances. I still remember in the late 1990s
when our local LGB bar association was one of the bar associations that
engaged in extraordinarily heated debates about whether to become an
LGBT organization and include transsexual people and concerns in its
mission. Some gay and lesbian members spoke out vociferously against
inclusion, arguing that the issues that affect transsexuals, as opposed to
gays and lesbians, are different and they should not be included under
the same umbrella.
Interestingly, it was at about this same time that the validity of mar-
riages in which one of the spouses was a transsexual started to be litigated.
In some of these cases, the transsexual spouse experienced some success, as
opposed to the same-sex marriage cases, which at this time met with uni-
versal failure. Suddenly, LGB organizations that were choosing to distance
themselves from transsexuals realized the marriage cases involving a trans-
sexual spouse had the potential to advance the same-sex marriage
movement. If courts could understand that determining a person's legal
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sex for purposes of marriage was not a simple straightforward proposi-
tion, then the state justification for limiting marriage to one man and
one woman is weakened. How can a state legally ban same-sex marriage
if experts, courts, and society are unable to agree on the factors that de-
termine whether someone is a male or a female? I think that these
developments may have played a role in building the LGBT alliance. It
may be a coincidence, but it is significant that the alliances grew at the
point when the successful arguments being advanced by transsexual liti-
gants could also be used by gays and lesbians challenging the mixed sex
marriage requirement.
MLARK STRASSER: Well, just one more thing on this. Texas is
one of the states that relies on chromosomes to determine the sex of an
individual, which is how we get the result in Littleton. But such a hold-
ing does not permit Texas to restrict marriage to those who appear to be
the traditional different-sex couple. It turns out that some transsexuals
are physically attracted to individuals of their self-identified sex. Accord-
ing to Texas law, an individual with XX chromosomes can only marry
someone with XY chromosomes, and an individual with XX' chromo-
somes can only marry someone with XX chromosomes. Suppose, then,
that a transsexual with XX' chromosomes undergoes gender reassignment
surgery and so is indistinguishable from any other woman that one
might meet on the street. The only type of person that she could legally
marry in Texas would be another woman, i.e., someone with XX chro-
mosomes. So, in Texas, we have individuals marrying who appear to be
same-sex couples, because one of them has XX chromosomes and the
other has XYX chromosomes. However, the marriage of the Littletons
could not be recognized because both of them had XX' chromosomes.
MIARYBETH HERALD: A thread going through all the decisions
is a fear of same-sex marriage. In considering these cases, the courts seem
concerned about the effect of their decisions regarding transsexuals and
implications for the same-sex marriage debate generally. But the ironic
consequence for post-surgical transsexuals stuck with the label of their
sex assigned at birth is that the marriage partners that remain legally
available to them are persons of the same gender. Some courts, in their
willingness to engage in cognitive distortions such as ignoring surgical
alterations, reach an anomalous result-condoning same-sex marriages
when they are committed to a heterosexual norm. In Gardiner, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court seemed to go even further by implying that the
Kansas statute precluded marriage for transexuals: "The plain ordinary
meaning of 'persons of the opposite sex' contemplates a biological man
ol. 17:1324
and a biological woman and not persons who are experiencing gender
dysphoria." 7
Obviously if same-sex marriage were lawful, these issues would dis-
appear for transsexuals. As it remains a contentious social issue, it unites
lesbian and gay organizations with the transgender movement. The in-
tersex movement is less sanguine about an alliance on the same-sex
marriage issue, however.
JULIE GREENBERG: At this point, I think it would be helpful to
discuss what has happened in the marriage cases in which one of the
spouses had an intersex condition. One of the reasons that I think that
some intersex activists have concluded that it is better not to join forces
with the LGBT movement is the belief that persons with an intersex
condition can fly below the radar. In other words, they can marry
whomever they please and their marriages are unlikely to be successfully
challenged. Unfortunately, based on what has happened in the marriage
cases involving a transsexual spouse and the two reported cases in which
one of the spouses had an intersex condition, I believe that this assump-
tion may be proven wrong.
\When I first started writing in this area, approximately 10 years
ago, I firmly believed that courts would treat marriages involving an in-
tersex spouse differently from the way that they would treat marriages in
which one of the spouses is a transsexual. I did not believe that they
would subject intersex persons to the same scrutiny as transsexuals. At
that time, only one reported case on this issue existed, In re C and D, a
1979 case from Australia.' 8 In that decision, the Australian Family Court
annulled a 12-year marriage between a woman and a man with an inter-
sex condition. In its astounding conclusion, the court held that a true
marriage could not have occurred because "the husband was neither a
man nor a woman, but was a combination of both." 9 In other words, as
a non-man/non-woman, he did not have the legal right to marry at all.
This case has been severely criticized and it is clear that courts in Austra-
lia, or elsewhere, would be unlikely to conclude that a person with an
intersex condition is not allowed to marry at all.
If the one recent reported case involving a spouse with an intersex
condition is a typical judicial reaction, it appears that courts may follow
the same approach that they do in cases involving a transsexual spouse.
In 2001, a court in England was asked to determine whether a marriage
was valid or whether the wife (who was referred to as "W') was actually
17. See In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002).
18. In Marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340 (Ausfi.).
19. In Marriage of C and D (falsely called C) (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340, 345 (Austl.).
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legally a man for purposes of marriage." At her birth, W's doctors were
unsure whether to assign her to the male or female sex. They left the
decision up to the parents, who decided to raise W as a boy. It was clear
at a very young age that W identified as a girl and wanted to live her life
as a female. When W turned 15, W's body began to feminize. Eventu-
ally, she underwent medical procedures to further feminize her body.
She lived her entire adult life as a woman.
W married a man who sought an annulment of the marriage alleg-
ing that W should not be considered a female. Although the court
eventually validated the marriage and ruled that she was a female, it did
so only after subjecting her to an intensive and invasive examination.
The experts testified that they believed that W had an intersex condi-
tion. Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (PATS). Women with
PAIS have male chromosomes and testicles. Often, their genitalia do not
appear to be clearly male or female. The court asked W to provide de-
tailed evidence about the appearance of her genitalia before the surgery
was performed. She was questioned about the size of her phallus, the
existence of testicles and scrotal sac, whether she had a vagina, the loca-
tion of the opening of her urethra, and whether she ever urinated in a
standing position. The court acknowledged that she likely suffered em-
barrassment and discomfort about being asked to provide this evidence.
Despite her reticence to provide detailed information about the appear-
ance of her genitalia, the court found this information critical to its
determination. In its findings, the court felt the need to provide an ex-
tensive description of her genitalia and specifically located her urethral
opening, "1at, or near, the end or tip of the flap of skin," that would have
been considered her phallus.2
The judge eventually determined that she was legally a woman for
purposes of marriage and based his decision on the three criteria: her sex
factors, her history and the medical evidence, and her ability to con-
summate the marriage. Based upon her history of self-identifying as a
female at a young age and choosing to live as a female before her surgery
and the diagnosis of PAIS, the court determined that assigning her to
the male sex on her birth record was an error.
The English court's determination that the wife was a female and
her marriage to a man was a legal heterosexual marriage is far superior to
the Australian judge's declaration that the husband with an intersex
condition was neither a man nor a woman. The decision, however,
should not be hailed as a model for future courts to follow. To attain the
legal status of female and the right to marry a man, W was required to
20. W v. W, [2001] Fain. I1I1 (Eng.).
2 1. W v. W, [20011] Fain. 11I1 (Eng.).
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provide embarrassing intimate information about the appearance of her
genitalia, her ability to engage in intercourse, and her preferred position
for urinating. In other words, the court treated her to the same type of
scruriny that has been applied in the cases involving a transsexual
spouse.
The second reason that I believe that the intersex community may
need to be concerned relates to Mark's discussion about who has been
allowed to challenge the validity of a marriage. Before the Litteton and
Gardiner decisions, I thought that a court would not allow a third party
to challenge the validity of someone else's marriage. I had assumed that
the cases would have to be brought by one of the spouses or potentially
the state. As Mark mentioned, however, courts have given standing to
strangers to challenge another person's sex and the validity of a marriage
in which they were not a party. The courts never discussed standing in
either the Litteton or Gardiner decisions. In Gardiner, a relative chal-
lenged the marriage, but in Litteton, it was a doctor who was defending
a wrongful death action. The court allowed him to litigate Christie
Littleton's legal sex and marital status so that he could avoid paying loss
of consortium damages in a wrongful death action.
Therefore, the intersex community has to recognize that an intersex
person's legal sex could be challenged not only by the state, but also by a
total stranger.
MARK STRASSER: One additional point about divisions within
or across communities. Beatie himself is somewhat controversial within
the transgender community. Some members of the community have
particular understandings of what it means to be a male or female and
believe, for example, that men do not deliver babies. On their view,
some individuals were simply born with the wrong parts, which can be
corrected to some extent by gender reassignment surgery. Transitioning
from one sex to another is fine-that is simply correcting a mistake. But
transitioning from female to male and then delivering a child is to cross
boundaries that should not be crossed. Others, of course, do not believe
that Beatie broke any "rules."
MARYBETH HERALD: Julie's discussion about the court's ex-
amination emphasizes the courts' adherence to the binary system. In
these decisions, there is an emphasis on the physical attributes of male
and female, as well as social and cultural ones. For example, in the New
Jersey decision, M T v. J T, the court considered the situation of a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual married to a male. Although the
court rejected the rule of birth sex as determinative, the court in M T also
focused on the adequacy of M.T.'s reconstructed body for "traditional
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penile/vaginal intercourse. 22 The concern was whether the person's sex-
ual machinery looks and could operate as a traditional female in
performing heterosexual intercourse. In the New Zealand case, Attorney-
General v. Otahuhu Family Court, the court required that the marriage
partners have genitals of a male and female respectively. The court dis-
pensed with the requirement that the person's genitalia were sexually
functional, however. The step forward in Otahuhu was that as long as
one of each sex was represented in the marriage, heterosexual appear-
ances were served and no further information was required. One could
cross over and become a member of the opposite sex, but one could not
disturb the binary sex or heterosexual marriage scripts.
Reinforcing the binary theme, some courts find it important that
the crossover be complete. For example, in In re Marriage of Simmons,
the court recognized a transsexual's surgical changes, but required a
complete crossover. Although the transsexual husband had some surgical
procedures, there were several remaining to complete the transition. The
court found this failure to totally cross over dispositive because although
the petitioner did not have a uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries, female
genitalia were still in place.2 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's holding that petitioner's marriage was an invalid same-sex mar-
riage because the petitioner was still a female. Similarly, in In re Heilig,
the court was willing to endorse a change in birth certificate as long as
the petitioner provided sufficient medical evidence that the surgery was
irreversible.
Although some courts have not required a complete physical cross-
over to the opposite sex, the permanency of the changes have impressed
the courts. The female-to-male transsexual in the Australian case of In re
Kevin had undergone only partial reassignment surgery-a mastectomy
and a total hysterectomy-but still had a vagina .2 ' Nevertheless, the
court noted the irreversible nature of the surgery as the important point.
The Australian court also placed emphasis on evidence that Kevin had
always been perceived to be male through the testimony of 39 witnesses.
It is the ability of Kevin to act stereotypically male-hogging the televi-
sion channel changer?-that gives him the freedom to cross over from
22. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 206 (N.J. 1976).
23. See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303. 309 (111. App. Ct. 2005).
24. In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68 (Md. 2003). But see Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 197 1) (invalidating a marriage between a male and
a male-to-female transsexual, stating that "mere removal of the male organs would
not, in and of itself, change a person into a true female."1).
25. In re Kevin (2001) 28 Fain. L.R. 158 (Austl.) available at http://www.austlii.edu.aul
aulcases/cthlfamily- et/200I11074.html, affd, (2003) 30 Fain. L.R. 1 (Austl.) avail-
able at hatp://www.austlii.edumau/au/cases/cth/family ct/200319hnl
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one Sex to the -other. Any drift away from stereotypical male behavior
may have proven fatal to the claim. The irony for feminists is that while
there have been efforts to root out and destroy gender stereotyping, in
this case, the more stereotyping, the more successful the claim.
JULIE GREENBERG: Mark has discussed the family law issues re-
lating to marriage and parentage that arise in sex determination actions.
I will briefly examine two other areas related to sex determination: iden-
tity documents and housing, bathroom, and locker room use.
As Mark mentioned, states vary widely in the "sex" test that they
use in the family law cases. Similarly, states have adopted a variety of
1sex' tests to determine the appropriate marker that should appear on
someone's identity documents. Some states have statutes that allow
transsexuals to change the sex marker on their birth certificate. Others
have general name change statutes. Some have no controlling legislation.
And, at least one state has a statute prohibiting a change of sex. In addi-
tion, the Social Security Administration and the State Department have
their own tests for sex determination that control the sex listed on social
security records and on passports. In other words, a person's sex can vary
depending upon which state or government agency is making the de-
termination."
Let's return to J'Noel Gardiner's case. J'Noel was born in Wisconsin
and she was identified as a male at birth, but she had successfully
changed all of her Wisconsin records so that they indicated that she was
a female. If J'Noel had married in Wisconsin and the status of her mar-
riage had been litigated in Wisconsin, she would have been determined
to be a female and her marriage to Marshall Gardiner would have been
considered a valid heterosexual marriage. But J'Noel traveled to Kansas,
married there, and had her marriage challenged in the Kansas court sys-
tem. When J'Noel crossed into Kansas, she was transformed back into a
legal male and her marriage to a man was determined to be an invalid
same-sex union.
To avoid this ludicrous situation, some might advocate for a univer-
sal sex test. England has taken this approach and has adopted a national
law that many believe is a desirable model. In 2004, England adopted
the Gender Recognition Act.2 This legislation allows transsexuals to
transition for all legal purposes so that no conflict exists among mar-
riage, social security, and identity document laws. The law is
advantageous *for many reasons, including the fact that transition is
allowed even without surgical alteration. England's rejection of a surgical
26. For a comprehensive list of these various rules see http://www.drbecky.com/
birrhcert.hrml (last visited Nov. 8, 2009).
27. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.).
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requirement is critical because not all transsexuals want surgery, and
even for those who would choose to have a surgical procedure, it may be
inaccessible because these surgeries are extremely expensive and for the
most part, they are not covered by insurance policies or Medicare. Rec-
ognizing this problem, England only requires an affidavit from a doctor
or psychologist confirming the person's gender identity.
England's approach, however, is potentially problematic for two
reasons. First, under the a conservative administration, the "sex test"
would not be beneficial because they would make it very difficult to
transition. Even with the Obama administration, I have my doubts that
a universal sex test is desirable. I believe that the United States is not
ready to allow a legal sex transition without significant surgical altera-
tion. Therefore, I believe that it would probably be better at this point
to allow the states to experiment until society is more open to allowing a
person's sex to be determined by his/her gender identity.
England's law is problematic for a second reason. Married people
who want to transition in England must first divorce their current
spouse because England's laws still limit marriage to heterosexual cou-
ples. Let's consider a couple in which one of the spouses is a male and
one is a female. They have been married for years and the male decides
to transition to female. Although the couple is in love and wants to re-
main married, England presents them with a Hobson~s choice. The
transsexual spouse can live as a woman and be legally recognized as a
woman only if she first obtains a divorce. If she wants to stay married,
she is not allowed to be legally recognized as a woman. In other words,
England has adopted a law that promotes the divorce of a happily mar-
ried couple who may have children.
The other alternative to a national approach is to continue the
state-by-state, agency-by-agency approach. If we allow states to continue
to adopt contradictory tests for determining a person's legal sex, then we
are confronted with the problem that people's legal sex, marital status,
and parenting status may change as they cross state borders, which raises
a number of constitutional issues, including full faith and credit, the
right to travel, substantive due process, and equal protection. We do not
have time to examine all of these issues in detail, but I want to spend a
few moments just mentioning some of the current full faith and credit
issues that have been raised .2
Full faith and credit issues are becoming more important recently
because a number of transsexuals are seeking court orders that recognize
28. For an in-depth discussion of these issues see Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald,
You Can't Take it with You: Constitutional Consequences of Interstate Gender Identity
Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REv. 819 (2005).
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their transition. Even in states that do not require a court order, attor-
neys are seeking court orders because an argument exists that court
orders should be given full faith and credit, while a sex change granted
by an administrative agency could be ignored under conflicts of law
principles. In addition to the full faith and credit issues raised by all of
these orders, a problem is arising because some of the judges who are
issuing them are not thinking through all of the ramifications. For ex-
ample, I have recently seen court orders issued by judges in Texas for
current residents of Texas who were born in a different state. These court
orders are directing the registrar of birth records in a sister state, for ex-
ample, Ohio, to modify the birth certificate. These judges are not
addressing the issue of whether a judge in Texas has jurisdiction over the
actions of an administrative agency in Ohio.
In addition to identity documents, a person's legal sex has also been
raised in other scenarios. For example, who can participate as a female in
athletic events? Where should transsexuals and persons with an intersex
condition be allowed to live in sex-segregated facilities like dormitories,
homeless shelters, and prisons? What bathroom and locker room should
they be allowed to use?
As far as athletics are concerned, different athletic organizations
have utilized a variety of "sex tests" and the tests used have varied dra-
matically over the years. The most recent tragedy involving athletic
gender testing is the case of Caster Semenya. After Ms. Semenya won
the 800-meter race in the World Championship, other teams challenged
her ability to compete in the games as a female. They alleged that she
was not a woman. Ms. Semenya was forced to undergo extensive testing.
The results of these tests were not released, but Ms. Semenya may have
some type of intersex condition. It also appears that Ms. Semenya, an 18
year old, learned this news at the same time that it was exposed to the
world in sensational international headlines. She is not the first female
athlete to have her sex challenged or to have the world learn the intimate
details about her reproductive system and the appearance of her genita-
lia.2
Housing issues have arisen primarily in the prison context and have
typically involved transsexuals, although one reported appellate court
decision addressed appropriate housing for a person with an intersex
condition. Most prisons do not have separate safe facilities for
transsexuals so male-to-femnale transsexuals are often housed in the male
population, where they are subjected to severe sexual abuse or isolated in
solitary confinement, a placement usually reserved for dangerous
29. LAMF Urges Caution of Semnenya Intersex Claims (Sept. 11, 2009), http:Ilwww.
cnn.com/2009/SPORT/09/ 1 1/athletics.semenya.gender.iaaf/index.html.
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prisoners who pose a risk to others and prisoners who have misbehaved.
For example, Mild Ann DiMarco, a female who was born with an
intersex condition, was convicted for check fraud and was placed on
probation. When she violated the terms of the probation, she was
imprisoned. Despite a security-threat rating that indicated that she
posed no risk to herself or others, she spent 438 days in solitary
confinement in a maximum-security prison. She was not allowed to
interact with other inmates and she had limited access to the day room,
commissary, educational opportunities, haircuts, religious items, a radio,
a lamp, or playing cards. She was forced to eat her meals alone in her
cell, while sitting either on her bed or toilet. Mild was placed in solitary
confinement because she was born with an intersex condition. Despite
the fact that she had lived as a female since puberty and was not sexually
functional as a male, she remained in isolation throughout her
incarceration .
Homeless shelters and college dormitories present similar problems.
This issue has not been litigated, but it appears that significant progress
is being made in this area. A number of sex-segregated homeless shelters
allow persons to live in facilities that comport with their gender identity.
Similarly, a number of colleges are also adopting more flexible ap-
proaches. I have two sons, one who just graduated from college and one
who is a junior in college. Both their schools changed their housing
policies recently and their housing form asks: Do you smoke? What
time do you wake up? What is your personal gender identity: woman,
man, other, prefer not to state? What is your biological sex: female,
male, intersex, or prefer not to state? What do you prefer your room-
mate is: male, female, transgender, intersex, or does not matter? The
schools leave all the options open. I think this is excellent progress.
Finally, bathrooms and lockers rooms seem the most resistant to
change. Some public restroom facilities are now unisex, but most bath-
rooms remain sex segregated and the male/female division is carefully
policed. We even have cases in jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination
based on gender identity that have found that it is not sex discrimina-
tion to bar a male-to-female transsexual from using the female
31restroom.
MLARK STRASSER: One of the interesting facets of the Gardiner
case was that J'Noel's birth certificate was amended in light of Wiscon-
sin law, and one of the questions before the Kansas Supreme Court was
whether to give credit to the Wisconsin record designating J'Noel as fe-
male. While the state's policy on this was not entirely clear, there was
already a regulation specifyring the conditions under which Kansas
30. DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007).
31. Goins v. W. Group, 635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001).
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would permit birth certificate modifications. So, it could hardly have
been said that recognizing a modification to a birth certificate would
have violated an important Kansas public policy; on the contrary, per-
mitting such modifications was in accord with Kansas policy. Given that
other states' records should be given some deference and that no Kansas
public policy would have been violated by recognizing a birth certificate
amendment, one might have expected the Kansas Supreme Court to
regard the Wisconsin amended birth certificate as establishing that
J'Noel was female.
The Kansas court was fearful, however, that recognizing J'Noel's
marriage would somehow open the door to same-sex marriage. That
same fear may motivate courts in Texas to refuse to recognize marriages
involving a post-operative transsexual and someone not of her or his
self-identified sex, although as a practical matter this means that Texas
only permits post-operative transsexuals to marry individuals of their
self-identified sex.
MARYBETH HERALD: The Gender Recognition Act in Eng-
land"2 is considered progressive and it does not require sex reassignment
surgery. If you do not have the sex reassignment surgery, however, you
do have to have a certificate of gender identity disorder. Both options
reinforce the binary system. The first requires surgical alteration to look
like the reassigned sex and the second requires one to assert that not fit-
ting into the established binary pattern constitutes a medical issue.
Early feminists also had the bathroom issue. Bathrooms, in fact,
may have sunk the Equal Rights Amendment. When the Equal Rights
Amendment was being considered, opponents emphasized the specter of
same-sex bathrooms. Instead of voters favoring equal rights, they came
to fear same-sex bathrooms. It is interesting but disheartening to see it
being raised again in this context.
On a broader level, discussion and education on issues affecting
transsexual and intersex persons will be necessary to spur legislative
change. More groundwork has to be laid at the local and state level. Al-
though interesting constitutional questions are raised by the treatment
of transsexuals as they cross state lines, it is probably not an opportune
moment to raise these issues in the court system until society moves
forward in its understanding. It is possible, however, that some of these
questions will arise when persons are denied their right to marry or are
treated differently when they move to another state. For example, does
treating post-operative male-to-female transsexuals differently from fe-
males identified as females at birth violate equal protection? Do
32. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (Eng.).
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contradictory sex determination rulings infringe on the right to travel
under the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clauses? The question of whether litigation can affect social change is
much debated."3 In the area of gay rights, the Supreme Court's infamous
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick inspired activism that accomplished the
political change that enabled the Supreme Court's reversal of that deci-
sion in Lawrence v. Texas 3 almost twenty years later. But having bad
decisions on the books can set a movement back, and litigation too early
in a movement's life may cost valuable time and resources.
MARK STRASSER. One more point to consider involves the De-
fense of Marriage Act (DOMA) .3 ' The federal government did not
include within that act any definition of sex. Perhaps this means that the
federal government will defer to the states, although that means that
there is yet another layer of confusion, because states are defining sex
differently-an individual might be female in New Jersey but male in
Texas.
MARYBETH HERALD: We have discussed the sex determination
issues in terms of family law, identity documents, housing, and bath-
room use. We will now move to the topic of sex discrimination and
discuss the meaning of the term "sexe in the statutes that prohibit dis-
crimination "because of sex."
A number of states and municipalities now explicitly prohibit dis-
crimination based on gender identity or expression. The question
remains whether transsexuals and persons with an intersex condition are
protected under state laws that do not explicitly include these statuses or
under federal laws.
Consider Tide VII, which covers discrimination in employment.
Title VII's language prohibits discrimination "because of sex." In early
cases, transsexuals might sue under Tide VII claiming, "Well, if you're
firing me from my job because I'm transsexual, you're discriminating
because of sex." The courts responded, "No, they are discriminating
against you because you are a transsexual and that does not violate Title
33. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BtUNG ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (The University of Chicago Press 1993).
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
35. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or
Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial pro-
ceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such rela-
tionship.").
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VII.,,16 In the view of these courts, Title VII discrimination based on sex
included cases where the employer fired a woman or refused to hire a
woman to be a bartender, because the employer only hired men. If the
employer refused to hire or fired a transsexual, that was not based on
sex, but on transsexual status, and not covered under Title VII. Al-
though the courts voiced concerns about stereotyping in sex
discrimination cases, the early courts' underlying conception of male
and female reflected rigid conceptions of male and female. Females have
XX chromosomes, look like women, want to have sex with men, and
have a female gender identity. Males have XY chromosomes, look and
act stereotypically like men, and want to have sex with women. Al-
though some males and females conform to the model, many do not. If
you deny a job to a male or female and they are the prototypical male or
female, that is covered under Title VII. But if you deny a job to some-
one who does not conform to the model, early courts glossed over the
complexity of gender identity and often held that the discrimination was
not "because of sex"' but rather because the plaintiff was gay, lesbian, or
transsexual, categories apparently disconnected from sex.
The case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins"7 represented a leap forward
in understanding. Ann Hopkins did not make partner in the firm.
Rather than take what has become the well-worn path of stating pretex-
tual reasons or remaining silent, luckily for her, the partners went on the
record with remarkable candor as to why they refused to admit her to
partnership. Their reasoning was: "You're just too macho. You should
walk more femininely, talk more femininely, and wear some jewelry and
makeup." The partners were not, in their opinion, opposed to having a
female in their ranks, but they wanted a stereotypical one. The Supreme
Court's opinion recognized that the partners took their action because
Ann Hopkins did not conform to female stereotypes and that was
discrimination because of sex. Almost casually they stated, "Really we're
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assum-
ing that they match the stereotype associated with their group." With
that, the theory of sex stereotyping was born. That they discriminated
against Ann Hopkins because she did not engage in feminine behavior
was, in fact, discrimination based on sex.
Probably no member of the Supreme Court at that time knew that
the Hopkins case would be so influential in cases of gay, lesbian, and
transsexual plaintiffs. But it turned out that what worked for feminists
36. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v.
Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cit. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cit. 1977).
37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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trying to put forth a more sophisticated view of sex discrimination was
opening the door to other groups. Gays and lesbians were generally dis-
missed out of Title VII because the discrimination was sexual
orientatrion discrimination, not sex discrimination. But now the claim is
framed as one based on failure to meet the gender stereotype that a male
is always sexually attracted to females, or females to males. The Price
Waterhouse partners discriminated against Ann Hopkins because she
did not conform to stereotypes about her sex and sexual orientation;
claims come under Title VII's "because of sce" language because one is
not conforming to sex stereotypes. Similarly, in the 1 970s, when trans-
sexuals would bring Title VII actions, their claims were uniformly
rejected. Now, after Hopkins, a transsexual plaintiff will frame the claim
that the defendant took the adverse employment action because the
plaintiff did not conform to sex stereotypes, that is, not all females con-
form to a female gender identity and not all males conform to a male
gender identity. There are significant victories in the circuit courts of
appeals using this theory.
For example, in one case a firefighter was living as a male but was
transitioning to female and he was harassed for his feminine appearance.
He spoke to the supervisor and then was suspended. The court consid-
ered the earlier cases rejecting the claims of transsexual plaintiffs but
dismissed their reasoning in light of Price Waterhouse and its sex stereo-
typing theory."8 The court held that discrimination against transsexuals
is, in fact, covered under Title VII even without amendments to include
that specific type of discrimination.
The most recent case where the court applied a theory of gender
stereotyping is Schroer v. Biiington." Diane Schroer was offered a job as
a terrorism analyst at the Library of Congress. She interviewed as Dave
because she had not formally transitioned from male-to-female. After
getting the job offer, she asked her new boss if she could start work as a
woman to make a clean transition. The Library revoked the job offer
saying she was not a "good fit." Schroer sued under Title VII and the
D.C. District Court denied the Librarys motion to dismiss, finding that
Schroer could bring a Title VII claim based on gender stereotyping and
discrimination because of sex. As to the latter claim, the court used re-
ligion to explain its reasoning in finding that discrimination based on
transsexual status was discrimination because of sex. If an employer dis-
criminated against Christians or Jews, the employer would be
discriminating based on religion. Similarly, it would be discrimination
38. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cit. 2004). See also Barnes v. Cincinnati,
401 F.3d 729. 737-38 (6" Cir. 2005).
39. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 306-08 (D.D.C. 2008).
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based on religion if the employer discriminated against persons who
converted to Judaism or Christianity. In Diane Schroer's case, discrimi-
nating against her because of her transition from male to female was
"because of sex" under Title VJI.
Price Waterhouse provided one theory that united a variety of
groups. By changing the focus from discrimination against a male or a
female, and recognizing the bundle of stereotypes that have become a
part of those terms, each group is able to target the stereotypes that
plague their group. As the court in the Schroer case recognized, how-
ever, there is no need to resort to a gender nonconformity theory
because discrimination based on transsexual status is discrimination be-
cause of sex.
MARK STRASSER: In sum, families where one of the parents or
spouses is rransgendered face a number of uncertainties. Even states
permitting sex markers on birth certificates to be changed may not treat
such changes as valid for all purposes. Further, individuals born in one
state but living in another face additional uncertainties, because the lat-
ter state may have different criteria for the conditions, if any, under
which. birth markers can be changed or the purposes for which such
changes will be recognized. The current law both within and across
states imposes unnecessary and unjustifiable burdens on the rransgen-
dered and must be changed.
JULIE GREENBERG: In addition to thinking about the effect of
these laws and rulings on the transsexual community, lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, transsexual, intersex, and feminist activists and scholars need to
carefully consider how they frame their claims and the alliances that
they may want to form. These different groups share common goals, but
they also have unique concerns and issues that they seek to advance. I
believe all these communities could benefit from studying the history of
other social justice movements. Many approaches have led to progress
for a number of disenfranchised groups, while other tactics have resulted
in marginalized groups being pitted against each other. As these
communities develop their strategies, they must be careful to consider
the effects of their approaches on other groups. t
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